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JUSTICE BREYER
AND THE RISE OF
GLOBALIZATION
An Analysis of the Jurisprudence of Justice Breyer as a
Pragmatic Visionary

Klee, Timothy Sajal
Washington College of Law, Fall 2019 | Course: LAW 795JB

Introduction
“Can our American judicial system, by seeing itself as one part of a transnational or multinational
judicial system enterprise, help to advance acceptance the rule of law itself?” 1 Justice Breyer asks this
question in the introduction of his book, The Court and The World. Generally, visionary Supreme Court
Justices are seen as advancing a particular ideology or lens that shapes their interpretation or
jurisprudence. Can a Justice that focuses on harmonizing laws be a visionary? By examining Justice
Breyer’s opinions on recent court cases, one can see his visionary lens of looking abroad for ways to
interpret cases in the United States. Additionally, the above question illustrates his long recognized
pragmatic view of the role of the Court. Justice Breyer has advocated for the role of the Court in its
decision to be “maintaining a constitutional system of government” (his italics). 2 This overarching goal
makes Justice Breyer a pragmatic visionary and is evident in his jurisprudence as an Associate Justice on
the United States Supreme Court.
The topic areas examined below span the legal spectrum. The reason for this is that no area is
untouched by the rise of globalization and an increasingly connected world. The first area to explore is the
concept of Rights, Liberty and National Security, framed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the new
millennium’s questions of what limits executive authority, and crime and punishment, including whether
a chemical weapons treaty can be applied in a domestic dispute. Next, I will show how the Court
addressed the advancement of the rule of law and human rights at home and abroad, and how Justice
Breyer argues for the modernization of the current statutes. As the rise of globalization is generally
thought of through the lens of economics and global business, section three examines how antirust, rules
of discovery, financial regulations, and copyright laws face new questions in a connected world. Lastly, I
will show how the Court and Justice Breyer handle the rise of international organizations and treaties that
cover a range of topics from international investment agreements and arbitration, rights of alien
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defendants, and child custody disputes. Across these topic areas, I will demonstrate that Justice Breyer’s
pragmatic goals are advanced by a visionary view of using international law and research to inform his
opinions.

I. Rights, Liberty and National Security
In this new millennium, the United States Supreme Court’s docket has had many new and difficult
cases that required the court to examine past legal doctrines. Justice Breyer argues that the Court has
shown a greater willingness than before to meet these challenges with a new approach to the Court’s role
in national security matters 3. This readiness on his part and the Court illustrates a pragmatic realization
that the Court is the institution uniquely positioned in our constitutional republic to provide checks on
Congressional and Presidential power at the intersection of individual rights and liberties. Justice Breyer,
by seeking to harmonize this new role for the Court, also shows his vision of a Court that is an active
participant in confronting new asymmetric threats. By examining cases in which the Court confronted
pressing issues that intersect individual rights, liberty and national security policy, this paper will
illustrate Justice Breyer’s new approach.
A. Political Question Doctrine
Justice Breyer argue the evolution from Cicero’s view that “when the cannons roar, the laws fall
silent,” to the Court now placing limits on the other branches’ conduct to ensure the rule of law prevails 4.
In the American context, since Marbury v Madison 5, the Court deferred to the Presidential authority that
fell under the delegated political powers. The court did not assert itself in cases that arose during war or
international relations incidents even into the Vietnam era. However, Justice Breyer now sees the Court as
neither following the Cicero or “Political Doctrine” that would prevent it from deciding the merits of
cases in which rights, liberties and national security are in question 6. By examining Justice Breyer’s
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jurisprudence within key cases during his time on the highest court in the land, the common thread is his
pragmatism and visionary view of the law.
This trajectory of the Court no longer differing to the other political branches is illustrated by a recent
case in which Justice Breyer was the lone dissenter. The case arose when a United State citizen wished to
exercise his right under a statute passed by congress to list his birthplace as Israel rather than Jerusalem 7.
The State Department refused to issue the passport citing that listing Jerusalem as part of Israel would
contradict the official policy. The eight-member majority found that there was a justiciable claim and the
political question doctrine was a not a bar to the Courts deciding the merit of the statute 8. Justice Breyer
felt differently and in his dissenting opinion stated “But in the Middle East, administrative matters can
have implications that extend far beyond the purely administrative. Political reactions in that region can
prove uncertain. And in that context it may well turn out that resolution of the constitutional argument
will require a court to decide how far the statute, in practice, reaches beyond the purely administrative,
determining not only whether but also the extent to which enforcement will interfere with the President's
ability to make significant recognition-related foreign policy decisions.” 9 This case and the majority
decision wade into the traditional matters that were left to the political branches, is one of the primary
reasons that Justice Breyer believe the Court must know what is going on abroad. 10 When this case was
reheard in 2015, the Court concluded that the statute by Congress, did infringe on the Executive Branch
authority. 11 Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion, stated that “I continue to believe that this case presents
a political question inappropriate for judicial resolution.” 12 While birthplace location on passports is a
serious matter for Middle East policy, the Court has also had to confront serious matters of life and
liberty.
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B. National Security and Liberty
Justice Breyer often cites the historic phrase that “the Constitution is not a suicide pact,” in the wake
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as the ‘War on Terror’ brought central issues of rights and liberty to the
docket of the highest Court in the land. A major question in the post-9/11 era is the extent to which a
President can use his authority to imprison enemy combatants or infringe on civil liberties. Four cases in
the mid-2000s during the early stages of the Global War on Terror illustrate how the Court is no longer
giving the President a “blank check”, but Justice Breyer correctly asks, ‘then just what type of check is
it?’. 13
The Court in four seminal cases, Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Bourmediene, attempted to place limits
on Executive Power. Justice Breyer views the implications of these decisions as the Court no longer using
the “political question” doctrine to avoid weighing in on these decisions. 14. He further argues that because
the Court has chosen to weigh in and review the government’s arguments related to national security
matters, the Court must consider actions that take place abroad and understand in greater detail the
evolving threats to our nation. 15 The Court now must develop an approach to address these complex
questions. Justice Breyer, as a visionary, sees an opportunity to look to the United Kingdom and Spain as
they may provide answers on how to deal with the need for the defendant’s lawyer to obtain the
appropriate security clearance to provide an effective defense. 16 Examining Justice Breyer’s judicial
opinions and thoughts on these cases will illustrate his pragmatic view on dealing with these critical
issues of individual rights when the country is facing increasing asymmetrical threats.
In Rasul, the Court had to decide whether U.S. District Courts could exercise jurisdiction over enemy
combatants that were captured in Afghanistan, as part of military force authorized by Congress and
executed by the President following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The US military
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transported the combatants to the US Naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba, where they did not have access to
counsel while in custody. They each filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 17 The six-member majority
found that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine the legality of the detention and thus limited the
authority of the President to detain non-citizen combatants. While Justice Breyer joined the majority and
did not pen an opinion himself, he did express his thoughts on the opinion in The Court and The World.
He noted that the Court did indicate that the federal courts should hear the habeas petition but not how the
District Courts should rule.
In Hamdi, the Court faced a similar decision about how an enemy combatant shall assert rights in a
court of law. Hamdi was a US Citizen captured in Afghanistan as an enemy combatant and held in a brig
in South Carolina 18. Here, the opinion authored by Justice O’Connor and joined by Justice Breyer, held
that Hamdi had the right to present his case to a neutral arbiter if he was not an enemy combatant, but if
he was an enemy combatant, then the President could detain him in the time of hostilities. Justice Breyer,
writing in The Court and The World, expanded on the importance of the process rights that the Court
affirmed in Hamdi, 19 including the constitutional rights to present their case before a neutral decision
maker and present arguments. This illustrated how the political branches, namely the Executive branch,
have some limits imposed by the Court.
In Hamdan, a Yemeni national was captured in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. He was
transferred to Guantanamo Bay, and President Bush approved him to be tried by military tribunal. 20 The
government argued that it was appropriate to try this foreign national in the military justice system but the
majority found that it raised separation of powers issues as the military courts were exclusively within the
executive branch. The Court, when looking to international context, including the uniform code of
military justice, Geneva convention and the US Constitution, found these tribunals were not illegal in and
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of themselves, however they were not lawful in the current context. Justice Breyer, in his concurrence,
focused on the intersection of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Congressional
authority. 21 Here, Justice Breyer in his classic pragmatic fashion, looked to harmonize the Congressional
authority within our Constitution and the International law. He pointed out that under the Geneva
convention that requires certain due process rights, Congress could authorize a special military tribunal
should exigent circumstances exist. Since Congress has not exercised this power to create such a
mechanism for the executive branch, the current tribunal structure was unlawful. 22
In Boumediene, again the question of enemy combatants’ rights to a habeas petition were raised; this
time following a Congressional act in response to the Rasul case. Congress passed the Detainee Treatment
Act that expressly removed United States Courts’ jurisdiction for habeas petitions of those held at
Guantanamo Bay. 23 The Court in Boumediene found that detainees at Guantanamo can assert their habeas
rights under the United States Constitution. While Justice Breyer did not write an opinion, he did share
his view of the case in The Court and The World, where he highlighted the fact that the petitioners were
held for six years without hearing the charges. 24 He argues pragmatically that the Courts are the
appropriate place for non-citizens after a reasonable amount of time.
Reviewing Justice Breyer’s opinions and thoughts on these cases that challenged the rule of law when
faced with an asymmetrical threat that is posed by terrorist groups, illustrate how he occupies the role of
legal visionary and pragmatist. His pragmatic view of the law is evident by his view that the Courts must
be the place for a neutral party to hear the facts against enemy combatants but recognizing the role of
Congress and the Presidency. He sees the Court wading into these areas more and more, and thus
proposes this innovative view of Judges looking abroad to know the world outside the United States. 25
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For example, he looks to the United Kingdom where the defendant’s counsel is from a select group of
lawyers who have security clearance. 26 As there is no going back, Justice Breyer sees that the Court must
serve its Constitutional role as a neutral arbiter between the Executive Branch and civil liberties of the
defendant; yet must remain cognizant that the Court must keep its legitimacy with the public by
producing sound judgements. 27
C. Criminal Law and the Death Penalty
Criminal law and, in particular, the use of the death penalty illustrates another topic area in which
looking abroad informs Justice Breyer’s opinions. The Court has had to look beyond the traditional
authority within the United States to assist with coming to a decision on pressing issues of applying
statutes, international treaties and the application of the death penalty to specific populations and more
generally.
i. The Death Penalty
Justice Breyer frequently looks abroad when it comes to cases that involve the imposition of the death
penalty, expressing how the United States is increasingly alone compared to other western countries. In
Ring v. Arizona, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment that the eighth amendment required a jury to
impose the death penalty, rather than the judge or panel of judges, for a felony murder conviction. He
noted that while many countries have abolished the death penalty, “the United States rates fourth in
number of executions, after China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.” 28 Justice Breyer continued to expound on
aberration of the use of the death penalty in America when compared to the rest of the world. In his
dissenting opinion, he took notice “that many nations—indeed, 95 of the 193 members of the United
Nations—have formally abolished the death penalty and an additional 42 have abolished it in practice.” 29
Additionally, when looking internationally, he noted that the United States varied by region of the world.
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Compared to Europe, Central Asia and the rest of the Americas, the United States stands alone in
executions as “Only eight countries executed more than 10 individuals (the United States, China, Iran,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen).” 30
Cases that involve specific boundaries of the death penalty, such as executing minors or those with
diminished mental capacity, drew Justice Breyer to again look abroad to inform his opinion or those he
joined. Justice Breyer joined an opinion written by Justice Kennedy on whether the execution of a person
who was under the age eighteen when they committed a crime violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. In this opinion, the Court took notice that all countries around the world except the United
States and Somalia approved of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child that barred the
death penalty for children. 31 In a related case dealing with the imposition of the death penalty on those
with mental retardation, the Court also looked abroad to inform its decision. While Justice Breyer did not
pen an opinion, he joined the majority opinion that noted that international Anglo-American heritage and
consensus did not support executing those who lacked the mental capacity to understand their action and
thus be deterred from committing murder. 32 These cases highlight Breyer’s view that the Court has and
must continue to look to authority outside the United States to guide their decisions.
ii. Application of Criminal Statutes and Treaties
The new global realities require the Court to understand and interpret United States Statutes and
International Treaties. The Court, and Justice Breyer specifically, have grappled with potential
unintended consequences in an increasingly global world and legal context.
In Small, the Court was confronted with the issue of whether a statute stating that someone convicted
in any court included foreign courts as well as domestic courts. 33 Here, the defendant was convicted in a
Japanese court for smuggling guns and ammunition into Japan. 34 Upon returning to the United States after
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serving five years for the crime in Japan, federal authorities charged Small and he subsequently pled
guilty for illegally purchasing a gun in Pennsylvania. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, sought to
address the circuit split as to the question of whether convictions in a foreign court apply in US
jurisdictions. His pragmatism was illustrated through the review of the legislative history. He found that
the intent was only to look at domestic convictions. 35 Furthermore, he found that there are many instances
across the world where a person could be sentenced for crimes that are not illegal in America. 36 This case
illustrates his visionary view of looking abroad to provide a pragmatic solution to the question at hand by
not defending the use of extraterritorial criminal sentences.
Another recent case presented a similar issue dealing with international law and domestic crimes.
Justice Breyer highlighted this case in The Court and The World, as it centered on applying an
international treaty domestically. In Bond, the question presented dealt with applying a Chemical
Weapons Convention that Congress adopted by statute and applied to the states. 37 Here, the defendant
found out her husband was having an affair with one of her closest friends and fathered the friend’s
baby. 38 The defendant, a microbiologist by training, had access to chemicals via her employer. She stole
chemicals from her employer and mixed them with other chemicals that she purchased from the online
retailer, Amazon.com. She spread these chemicals throughout her friend’s home over the course of more
than two dozen visits. Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts. In the
Chief Justice’s opinion, the Court analyzed the Chemical Weapons Convention and the language in the
treaty that formed the basis for the statute. The Court found that while the intent was to be a
comprehensive ban on the use of chemical weapons, the conduct by Bond was not in a war-like
situation. 39 Additionally, the extension of the federal statute to a local criminal case raised issues of
federalism and the limited enumerated powers delegated to the federal government. Applying this statute
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to a local offense would “dramatically intrude upon the traditional state criminal jurisdiction”. 40 The
treaty and subsequent statute did not intend to reach to the conduct of a local criminal targeting a single
individual, but rather nation state and terrorist actors.
The common thread throughout all these cases advances the contention put forth by Justice Breyer: in
an increasingly global world, the Court must look beyond the traditional sources of interpreting United
States laws. To confront these new challenges, it takes a visionary approach to address threats both
foreign and domestic. The other branches of the federal government may try to usurp power, such as in
the Guantanamo cases, and the Court must be prepared to address the issues raised by these new threats.
This pragmatic need to assert the rule of law in an increasingly changing world, such as the application of
the death penalty, illustrate Justice Breyer’s recognition that the advancement of law in the 21st Century
requires a visionary view of the law to achieve a fair and just outcome.

II. Human Rights at Home and Abroad
How does an institution such as the Supreme Court help ensure human rights in a world faced with a
rapidly changing reality? While Justice Breyer finds the answer through the Court’s role in interpretation,
the Court cannot modernize the statutes alone, as justices are not experts in the practices outside the US. 41
He argues that it is the role of Congress to address the need to modernize the Alien Tort Statute that has
not been amended in over 200 years to protect victims in the contemporary context. In the cases that
follow, one can see how Justice Breyer achieved pragmatic outcomes for parties through visionary uses of
sources outside the American law context.
The Alien Tort Statute was passed in the early days of our republic in the year 1789. It states that
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 42. Justice Breyer recounts
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the historical incidents prior to the ratification of the United States Constitution that informed the drafting
of this statute in The Court and The World. 43 An altercation between a former French army officer and the
French Consul general in Philadelphia in 1784 was an antecedent to the statute. This incident involved a
physical attack of caning on the streets of the city by a former army officer of the French Consul. 44 France
wanted to extradite the former army officer while Pennsylvania would not comply with request. The
Continental Congress powers were severely limited under the Articles of Confederation and could not
intervene with Pennsylvania on France’s request. In another incident involving a foreigner in New York
City, a police officer entered the Dutch ambassador’s home to arrest a servant. The Dutch government
complained about this violation of their sovereignty, termed the law of nations. 45 These incidents were the
reason for the creation of Alien Tort Claims statute to allow non-citizens to bring a claim in United States
Federal Courts.
In 2004, a case presented the Court with a difficult decision about whether the Alien Tort Statute
applied. In Sosa, the plaintiff, Dr. Alvarez-Machain, was a doctor that assisted Mexican drug dealers in
torturing a Drug Enforcement Agency agent. 46 He kept the agent alive during the torture by the drug
dealers before being subsequently murdered. Years after the murder, Alvarez-Machain was indicted by a
grand jury for the agent’s murder. 47 While the Mexican government would not extradite him to the United
States, the Drug Enforcement Agency ended up contracting with Mexican nationals to kidnap the doctor
and transported him to United States for trial. 48 However, the district court dismissed the criminal charges
and Alvarez returned to Mexico. Upon his return, he filed suit against one of his kidnappers, Jose Sosa. 49
At the district court level, Alvarez-Machain’s claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act was dismissed
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while granting summary judgement under the Alien Tort Claims statute for $25,000 for violating the “law
of nations.” 50
The Supreme Court reviewed the case after the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the district
regarding the Alien Tort Claims Statute. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, found two inferences
could be made about the intent of the Alien Tort Statute: (1) “there is every reason to suppose that the
First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a
future Congress or state legislature that might, someday, authorize the creation of causes of action or itself
decide to make some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners; (2) is that
Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations
of the law of nations.” 51 These inferences led them to find that the plaintiff’s claim could not proceed
under jurisdiction by the statute.
Justice Breyer’s concurrence focused on the role of comity and the meaning of law of nations. Justice
Breyer focused on the international law and the majority’s view that to qualify for recognition under the
statute, there must be widespread acceptance of the standard. 52 Justice Breyer cited an International Law
Association report in building his argument on procedural and substantive law. He also cited a supreme
court case from Israel in the search for comity. If the law of nations is the criteria to be used, Justice
Breyer looked to these sources because the implication is that other nations' courts do the same. 53 In his
book, Justice Breyer highlighted the need for different nations to work together in harmony because of the
increase in interdependence. 54 While in this case, the claim could not stand under the current Alien Tort
Statute, there is a need for law to protect human rights around the world.
Following the Sosa case and the standard of widespread acceptance, lower courts allowed civil
actions to proceed against corporate defendants that aided foreign governments that harmed their
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citizens. 55 Justice Breyer noted the examples of the law suit against ExxonMobil for aiding and abetting
the Indonesian government’s torture and murder of their citizens; a mining company was sued for the
actions Papua New Guinea’s war crimes; and even banks, oil companies and car manufacturers’ were
sued for supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa.
Another case, Kiobel, raised the issue as to whether a foreign company, Royal Dutch Shell, could be
subject to jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims statute for actions that took place in Niger. 56 The
majority found that the Alien Tort Claims statute did not permit this extraterritorial issue to be raised in
the United States courts. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment in an opinion that was joined by
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan focused on the principles and practices of the
foreign relations law. 57 Instead of denying the claim based on the presumption against extraterritoriality,
Justice Breyer delineated the three areas that jurisdiction would arise under the Alien Tort Statute, “(1)
the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest.” 58 Justice Breyer
expanded on the concept of national interest to include the interest in not allowing the United States to
become a safe harbor for torturers - not unlike the pirates or slave traders that were in the scope of the
statute when drafted. Since the defendant did not seek safe harbor in the United States, jurisdiction on the
statute was not appropriate.
Justice Breyer in The Court and The World argues that the Court has found a middle group, one that
limits but does not prohibit cases that advance human rights. The Court, according to Justice Breyer, will
address these issues in the future by protecting victims who seek refuge in the rule of law for crimes that
were committed abroad. However, the scope of the Alien Tort Claims statute will continue to be
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discussed and should be modernized by congress. 59 Furthermore, the area again highlights the need for
the Court to look at international law, foreign law, and international affairs to guide their judgment.

III. The Court Faces Economic Realities of Globalization
Just as the Court had to confront the limits of the law in the criminal and human rights context, the
increase in globalization brings new challenges to extending rule of law across the world. Justice Breyer’s
pragmatism is in full display in the context of global commerce. Looking back at history, Justice Breyer
noted that when people lived most of their lives in the same place, “statutist” system of laws worked
well. 60 This “statutist” system is one in which the physical location determined the legal status and rights.
Furthermore, in the American context, our rules have favored interest balancing to interpret rules and
doctrines, including the presumption against extraterritorial application of laws and the use of comity to
balance other nations. Justice Breyer argues that these economic cases are complex with ambiguous
jurisdiction and the Court now as a pragmatist, seeks to harmonize enforcement of domestic and foreign
law, rather than just avoiding conflicts. 61 Furthermore, he argues that the Court must expand its
knowledge of foreign legal practices, business practices, regulations and procedures to appropriately
determine the application of domestic laws. 62
A. Antitrust Laws
Justice Breyer notes that one area over which our domestic laws have always had some effect outside
our borders is Antitrust enforcement. 63 Because conduct of firms, such as price fixing, can take place inpart abroad and yet affect American consumers, it has been a longstanding practice for authorities to
analyze activity outside our boarders. Congress, in 1982, attempted to clarify the Sherman Act’s
application to conduct taking place outside the United States. The amendment sought to create by statute
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the two-part test created by Judge Hand in the Alcoa case – that Sherman Act does not apply to conduct
involving commerce or trade with foreign nations unless the conduct had a direct, substantial and
foreseeable effect on the domestic market. 64 This amendment set the stage for a case involving a global
cartel of vitamin manufacturers.
In Empagran, the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of foreign and domestic purchasers
of vitamins. 65 The core question was whether the foreign conduct was anticompetitive, if it had an
adverse effect domestically, and if an independent foreign effect could give rise to a claim in the United
States courts. 66 The class action suit alleged that vitamin manufacturers and distributors conspired to fix
world-wide prices. 67 The plaintiffs were distributers in foreign countries seeking to purchase vitamins
from outside the United States. 68 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, took notice of many other
nations’ enactment and enforcement of their own Antitrust law. In his pragmatic fashion, he asked the
question as to whether it was “reasonable to apply those laws to foreign conduct insofar as that conduct
causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim?” 69 Justice
Breyer found that it was not reasonable to extend the Sherman and Clayton Acts to this conduct because
the plaintiffs could not show adverse domestic effects in a purely foreign transaction. 70
Furthermore, Justice Breyer discussed the doctrine of comity to understand the congressional intent of
the 1982 amendment. This concept occurs when potential conflict of laws of nations are concerned with
the intent of the legislature to be to reasonably avoid the conflicts where possible. 71 Justice Breyer noted
that the United States Courts apply the rule of reasonableness when seeking to avoid a conflict of law in
the court case at hand. Writing about the amicus briefs filed in this case, he was particularly persuaded by
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the ones from other countries that highlighted how antitrust rules were applied within their jurisdiction. 72
Briefs from the United Kingdom and Netherlands warned the Court that ruling in favor of extending the
Sherman Act into purely international transactions could have serious consequences for European Union
antitrust enforcement. These arguments persuaded Justice Breyer about the concept of comity and issues
of applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially. 73 The amnesty programs used by the Europeans as part of
their antitrust enforcement regime would be severely harmed by the treble damages allowed under the
Sherman Act.
The advancement of comity by the Justice Breyer opinion illustrates his brand of visionary
pragmatism. By recognizing the broader international business regulatory system of foreign laws and
bilateral agreements among nations to protect competitive markets Justice Breyer was visionary in
considering the present and future consequences. Yet, the higher purpose was pragmatic, to provide a
workable framework for commerce to occur in an increasingly connected global marketplace. Here,
jurisdiction was not appropriate as these international transactions should be governed by the law of the
nations that were substantially affected by the cartel.
B. Discovery
What happens when one multinational corporation alleges another multinational competitor engaged
in behavior that violated European antitrust laws and the commission does not seek additional
documents? Can the alleging party obtain the ability to proceed with discovery on their own by using
United States laws? These questions were brought to the Court in 2004.
In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) filed a complaint
with the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Communities that Intel
Corporation (Intel) was violating antitrust law. 74 In the complaint, AMD complained that Intel violated
the European law by abusing its market position through the use of exclusive purchasing agreements,
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loyalty rebates, price discrimination and standard-setting cartels. 75 AMD encouraged the DirectorateGeneral for Competition to request access to the relevant evidence that was disclosed by Intel in prior
litigation in the United States. 76 When the Directorate-General declined to seek access to the previously
disclosed documents, AMD filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California to compel the discovery of the evidence from the earlier case. 77
Intel argued that the statute AMD used for jurisdiction was only for active litigants, foreign
sovereigns or their agents, and that AMD as an entity that lodged the complaint with the European
Commission lacked standing. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, rejected Intel’s argument. 78 The
Court found that AMD did qualify as an interested party and could proceed with their case. Additionally,
the Court also rejected the Intel’s arguments that the European Commission did qualify as a tribunal
under the statute, and that discovery would be permitted even if it would not be allowed to proceed in a
domestic litigation. 79
Justice Breyer was the lone dissenter in this case. He found that the majority read the statute more
broadly than congress intended. 80 In particular, Justice Breyer raised concerns that the majority opinion
created a case by case framework for reviewing future issues under the statute. He instead argued for
adoption of two categorical limits. First, when determining what qualifies as a tribunal, the district court
should use the foreign country’s definition of what is tribunal. This limitation would bring the application
of the statute in line with the intent of congress. Second, discovery should only be permitted in situations
where it would be authorized in the foreign system and permitted by our Federal Rules of Civil
procedure. 81 Justice Breyer’s solution illustrates his pragmatic nature to find a workable solution that
keeps discovery costs down for litigants. His rationale was informed by his visionary approach to
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incorporating non-traditional sources to inform his opinion. For example, he reviewed research that
examined the economic effects of litigation written by members of the European Commission that
investigates antitrust. 82
What does this ruling mean for the Court and cases going forward? Justice Breyer put forward his
thoughts in The Court and The World, where he outlined four lessons. First, the Court had to learn about a
foreign court system. 83 Second, this is a difficult task for the Court as it is not an expert in foreign legal
systems. 84 Third, while the Court opted for the case-by-case approach rather than express rules, this
approach could create difficulties with predicting future results. 85 Forth, the Court needs better ways to
learn about foreign systems than just briefs and oral arguments. This information gap, as Justice Breyer
calls it, will hopefully close through the work of participants in the legal profession: lawyers, judges and
academics. 86
C. Security Regulations
The changing global commerce realities have also brought new questions and challenges in the field
of securities regulations. In the 1930s, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an important rule
(§10b-5) barring a person from making a false statement or engaging in fraud. 87 The question the Court
faced is whether this rule applies to conduct that occurs abroad. Does it matter if some activity took place
in United States and some abroad? Does it matter where the securities are traded, in the United States or
abroad? The Court attempted to answer these questions in the case of Morrison.
In Morrison, Australian shareholders sued the Australian National Bank, the parent company of a
Florida subsidiary, for fraud under Rule §10(b-5) of the Exchange Act. 88 The shareholders in their
complaint alleged fraud by the Australian National Bank and the subsidiary Florida mortgage servicing
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company, HomeSide Lending. 89 The fraud was related to the valuation of the outstanding mortgages
HomeSide had on their books. 90 Australian National Bank, in public documents, listed the value of the
HomeSide as assets based on the projections of the outstanding mortgages. In 2001, Australian National
Bank wrote down the value of HomeSide by over $2 billion dollars over the course of three months. 91
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the extraterritorial application Exchange Act in this
instance was not supported by reading of the statute or legislative intent. 92 Justice Scalia was not
convinced by the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs. First, that the act covered interstate commerce
between the states and foreign nations and should apply in this case. Second, that the act’s purpose was to
cover “prices established and offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted
throughout the United States and foreign countries” would apply to the foreign stock exchange. Justice
Scalia pointed out that the act does mention the extraterritorial application which placed limits on the
application. Justice Scalia, in summary, found that “In short, there is no affirmative indication in the
Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.” 93
Justice Breyer concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He pragmatically sought to
emphasize how the purpose of the statute was to protect American investors by finding that §10(b) applies
to fraud in two categories: first, any security registered on the national securities exchange or purchase or
sale of any security not registered. 94 Second, citing the presumption against extraterritoriality, he agreed
the case could not procedure under the Securities and Exchange Act. 95 Furthermore, he highlighted his
visionary view of looking at the application of this ruling in the international context as illustrated in the
amicus briefs from other countries. Justice Breyer was persuaded by these briefs that issued warnings to
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the Court, arguing that extending this regulation abroad would have serious consequences with the
foreign securities regulations.
D. Copyright
The Court faced another question about the application of United States laws to actions that started
abroad. How does copyright law apply in a global context? How do the doctrines that guided The Court’s
interpretation bend to the changing global realities of commerce? This next case involving a Thai student
living in the United States and his attempt to save money on college textbooks provides some answers.
In Kirtsaeng, the question about the application of copyright laws to the private importation of
college textbooks was answered by Justice Breyer and the Court. 96 Here, a Thai doctoral student was sued
by the textbook publisher for violating copyright laws. The Thai student had his relatives in Thailand
purchase the English version for a much lower price than offered in the United States. He would then sell
them, using the proceeds to pay back his family and friends for their expenses and keeping any remaining
profit. 97 The publisher brought the lawsuit against the student alleging this arrangement violated
copyright laws based on his unauthorized importation of the books and subsequent resale. 98 While the
District Court ruled the student could not assert the “first sale” doctrine defense, Justice Breyer disagreed.
Writing for the majority, he stated that the “first sale” doctrine would apply non-geographically. The
“first sale” doctrine states that the original holder of copyrighted material has the exclusive right of the
first sale of the item. After the purchase, the transaction transfers ownership of that specific item to the
purchaser. The purchaser is free to subsequently sell the item without violating the law.
Justice Breyer was not persuaded by the arguments advanced by the publisher. He looked at the
historical precedent dating back to Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson who imported used books
from foreign nations. 99 He also pragmatically looked at the economic impact of applying the first sale
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doctrine to specific geographic regions. He noted that $2.3 trillion of foreign goods were imported in
2011 alone. Justice Breyer also demonstrated his visionary orientation to the law and its affects abroad in
this case by noting that any change in the laws would have a very disruptive effect to this global
economic activity. 100
E. Personal Jurisdiction
Another area we see the Court having to confront the changing global economy and current legal
framework is with the doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction. Personal Jurisdiction is doctrine that allows a
court to exercise authority over the parties. How far can jurisdiction extend to companies beyond our
borders? What are the rules of fair play and substantial justice for companies? How does participation in
the stream of global commerce expose a company to being hauled into court in countries far and wide?
The Court attempted to answer these questions in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., which involved a tort
claim with a foreign manufacturer of metal-shearing machine. 101 Justice Kennedy writing for the majority
of The Court, found that the manufacturer did not purposefully avail itself of the laws of the United
States. This finding was supported by the fact that the manufacturer did not directly market or sell its
product to United States consumers, rather it used an independent distributer. 102
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment of the Court that jurisdiction should not be extended to this
case. However, he did not agree with the majority’s position on changing the existing legal framework
and precedents. 103 Justice Breyer pragmatically focused on the importance of precedent guiding the
disposition of the case. He was concerned by the majority’s abandonment of the accepted practice of
looking at the minimum contacts with the forum state. In his visionary fashion, Justice Breyer looked at
the implications of the ruling on foreign manufacturers, especially small manufacturers. “It may be
fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt/maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a
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Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through international distributors, to respond to productsliability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States, even those in respect to which the foreign
firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly defective) good.” 104 Justice Breyer, in his
opinion, sought to keep the existing framework of fact-finding to determine where jurisdiction is
appropriate. 105

IV. The Court and Treaty Interpretation
This paper has examined the challenges and new questions that globalization raised for substantive
and procedural law. But what about treaty interpretation? How do Article III courts apply treaties that
have been agreed to by the other branches of government? Justice Breyer in The Court and The World
takes notice of the rise of international agreements. 106 These agreements have, since the time of the
nation's founding, increased in scope the traditional areas war and peace, control of over territory and
trade. Now treaties cover topics such as individual social and political rights, technical aspects of
commercial contracts and arbitration, and family law areas of marriage and child custody, and these areas
now transcend national borders.
A. Arbitration
The trend of alternative dispute resolution from traditional expensive litigation has also been applied
to the international context. How does the Court interpret an international investment treaty between
foreign parties? What are the guiding principles and questions the Court should use in the application of
treaty to specific situations?
In BG Group, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, illustrated his visionary legal analysis by
looking at the international context and pragmatic effects of the decision. First, he took notice of the
importance of the use of arbitration to reduce cost and increase efficiencies in dispute resolution. 107 Citing
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scholarly works that analyzed “dispute-resolution mechanisms allowing for arbitration are a “critical
element” of modern-day bilateral investment treaties.” 108 Justice Breyer saw that the foundational
question was whether the treaty should be interpreted as an ordinary contract by the Court. Here, Justice
Breyer found that analyzing the treaty as a contract did not make a critical difference in the outcome. 109
Justice Breyer found that the Article 8 of the treaty bound the parties to arbitration like a procedural
clause in a contract. 110 In his opinion, he cites multiple international authorities that support this
interpretation of the treaty as governing the procedure of the dispute. Justice Breyer determined that
because the treaty functioned as a procedural precondition in a domestic contract, the local litigation
requirement is also a procedural provision that arbitrators, not courts, primarily should interpret and
apply. 111
Again, we see Justice Breyer as pragmatic visionary, looking abroad for additional sources to guide
his analysis of the issue. Yet, he focused on finding a pragmatic outcome for current and future litigants to
have a framework to use going forward. His choice to treat an international treaty as a contract illustrates
the appreciation of giving future parties a way to interpret these issues.
B. The Rise of Treaties
Justice Breyer in The Court and The World highlights the dramatic growth of international treaties
and international organizations. The United States participates in nearly a quarter of international
organizations. 112 These organizations set standards, procedures and conduct of nations and at times even
their individual citizens. These international organizations may even have their own courts or other
judicial mechanisms. 113 How does the Court balance these treaties with domestic law? Justice Breyer used
two cases, Sachchez-Llamas and Medellin, to illustrate how the International Court of Justice can inform
American criminal law.
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In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court had to answer three questions, First are there rights under the Vienna
Convention that criminal defendants can assert; Second, does the Vienna Convention provide a
suppression remedy for the statements made by the defendant; Third, can the State in postconviction
proceeding raise a default defense as the defendant did not raise the claim at trial? Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, found that even if the Convention created rights of the defendant to have contact
with their home national consulate, suppression was not the appropriate remedy and the State can use the
regular procedural default rule claims. 114 Justice Breyer, in his dissent highlighted his differences with the
majority opinion. First, he analyzed the Vienna Convention and found that it did indeed create the
obligation on the police to notify the home country. Second, he found that in certain circumstances the
State default rules must yield to the Convention. Third, Suppression may be an appropriate remedy in
certain circumstances. 115
Justice Breyer as a visionary looked at how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) resolved two
claims made by Germany and Mexico against the United States for violating the Convention. The ICJ
rejected the United States’ claims that consular notification did not extend to the individual and that it
imposed these obligations on the domestic proceedings. Furthermore, the concept of review and
consideration of these claims cannot be barred if the police authority failed to notify the foreign national
of their rights and thus prevent them from raising the claim. 116 Again, we see Justice Breyer seek
information from sources outside the United States to inform his decision. As a visionary, he looks to an
international body’s review of United States conduct to harmonize our laws. As a pragmatist, he states, “I
would seek to minimize the Convention's intrusion and federal intrusion into the workings of state legal
systems while simultaneously keeping faith with the Convention's basic objectives.” 117 Therefore, he does
find that if authorities did not advise a defendant of his rights, suppression may be appropriate under the
treaty.
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In Medellin, a death row inmate appealed his capital conviction following the ICJ ruling on the
Vienna Convention. Here, the defendant raised the claim that he was not informed of his rights to contact
the Mexican consulate following his arrest for murder. The ICJ claim named Medellin as one of the
Mexican nationals who was denied his rights under the Convention. 118 The Chief Justice, writing for the
majority, found that the ICJ ruling was not binding as Congress did not pass a statute following the
signing of the Vienna Convention. 119 Additionally, the Court did not accept the argument that the
President, by signing the treaty, could pre-empt domestic law without congressional action. 120 Justice
Breyer dissented from the Court’s opinion. He found that under the circumstances, the United States did,
through the treaty, consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and that our domestic courts should follow its
decision. 121 Justice Breyer took notice that the United States has signed over 70 treaties under the ICJ and
the “upshot is that treaty language says that an ICJ decision is legally binding, but it leaves the
implementation of that binding legal obligation to the domestic law of each signatory nation.” 122
These two cases illustrate Justice Breyer as a pragmatic visionary. He seeks to harmonize the treaties
and rulings from ICJ, with domestic law. Moreover, he recognized the pragmatic need of the courts to
address this issue. 123 His dissent provided guidance for lower courts to use in determining how to apply
the treaty that did not create a new claim and would avoid constitutional controversy. 124
C. Child Custody
A final area of the law where the rise of globalization has been interjected into traditionally domestic
issues is child custody. How does the Court decide transnational child custody disputes? How do treaties
designed to protect child trafficking implicate parents in a custody case? The Court had to wade into this
difficult legal territory in the past decade.
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In Abbott, The Court had to deal with transnational child custody. Here, the mother was a United
States citizen married to a British citizen. 125 Their child was a natural born citizen of the United States.
The Abbotts moved to Chile when the child was about seven years old and subsequently divorced. 126 The
mother was given primary custody with the father given visitation rights. As part of the custody
agreement, the child could not be taken out of the country by either parent without authorization by the
Chilean court. 127 After the mother found out that the father had obtained a British passport for the child,
she feared the father was planning on taking the child to the United Kingdom. The mother obtained a
court order forbidding the father from taking the child to Britain. Still fearing that the father would take
the child, the mother took the child to Texas without approval from the Chilean Court or the father. 128
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Convention). 129 The question in this case centered on the return remedy
within the convention. If the parent was found to have abducted the child, they must be returned to the
country of origin. The District Court had dismissed the claim by the father to have the child returned and
the fifth circuit affirmed. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion remanded the case for further proceedings to
determine if there were compelling reasons for the child to remain in the United States. Absent these
reasons, the child should be returned as this remedy helps deter parental abductions, which is the intent of
the treaty.
Justice Breyer joined the dissenting opinion written by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens found the
requirement of return in this case ran counter to the intent of the treaty as the mother had sole custody.
Stevens found that the treaty’s intent was to address joint-custody agreements, not those where one parent
only had limited visitation. 130 Justice Breyer, in The Court and The World, expressed his views further by
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questioning why the father’s limited visitation could veto the mother’s choice on where to raise the
child. 131 He agreed that the treaty was focused on rights of custody and not just visitation.

V. Conclusion
Through the review of legal topics ranging from human rights, national security, child custody,
discovery rules, criminal law and punishment, including the death penalty, I have shown that Justice
Breyer is a pragmatic visionary. He advances his pragmatic goals through a visionary approach of
incorporating international law research in his decisions. This non-traditional material provides a greater
and more complete context for his opinions. Justice Breyer argues that the Court must become more
aware of the changing world and how its rulings should harmonize with other nations and international
law bodies. His own jurisprudence lays the groundwork for how the Court should increase its awareness
as its docket will continue to face challenges of globalization.
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